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In 1560, eleven years after first setting foot on Kyūshū, Japan’s southwestern main is-
land, Christian missionaries received permission to proselytize in Kyōto. While the mis-
sionaries had already had various encounters with indigenous religious groups, it was 
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here in the capital, where Buddhist temples of a great variety of sects abounded, that the 
contact with Buddhism was most intense. In June of that year, 1560, Lourenço Ryōsai, a 
Japanese convert later to become the first Japanese member of the Society of Jesus, wrote 
a letter from Kyōto to his superiors at their mission station in southwestern Japan, de-
scribing Buddhist attitudes towards the Christian teaching: “The Shingon sect says that 
we teach their Dainichi, the Zen sect that our Dios is their hōben, the Hokke sect that 
our Dios is their myō, and the Jōdo sect that our Dios is their Amida.”2
While it would be difficult to accept Lourenço’s description at face value, given that it 
represents the writing of a missionary about heathen attitudes, the letter conveys a clear 
picture of a situation characterized by competition. The Buddhist sects3 are depicted as 
being aware of the Christians, as communicating with them, indeed as challenging them. 
At the same time, the letter claims that Buddhists even identified the Christian God 
with their own supreme deities or concepts. While, again, we cannot necessarily fully 
trust Lourenço, such an attitude would not be entirely surprising, given that: a) such an 
identification is frequent in the early contact between religious traditions,4 and b) that 
the Christian missionaries to Japan indeed shared a similar sentiment during the first few 
years of their activities (see below).
While the one-time identification of Buddhist teachings with Christian ones was not 
of lasting impact, the notion of the commensurability of Christianity, i.e., the idea that 
Christianity belonged to the same category of entities as Buddhism, did survive the 
following decades. In other words: Christianity continued to be seen as worthy of en-
gagement, be it in a meaningful dialogue or from a hostile point of view. Due to a 
lack of sources, this point is surprisingly difficult to prove. Indeed, the quotation from 
Lourenço’s letter is one of the few sources we have on the topic at hand because there are 
literally no texts directly giving the Buddhist view of things from before 1600. One pos-
sible way to circumvent this methodological problem is to examine how the language of 
the period refers to religious phenomena. In the absence of deeper-running theological 
treatments, I will therefore concentrate on the conceptual realm, in which the attitude of 
commensurability described above can be discerned quite clearly, especially when turn-
ing to the categories used to refer to foreign religion. Drawing on the distinction between 
an abstract concept of religion and an umbrella term for religions conceptualized in the 
introduction to this volume,5 I will show how, despite the absence of an equivalent to 
the former, something like the latter developed more clearly from around 1600 than had 
been the case earlier, prefiguring linguistic innovations taking place in mid-nineteenth 
century Japan. Furthermore, it was the encounter with the Christian religion as a result 
of Christian missionary activities in Japan from the mid-sixteenth century onwards that 
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of the Tokugawa state in the first decades of the seventeenth century. These factors help 
explain why a similar development did not occur in China, where Christian missionaries 
were active at around the same time.
In contrast, up to the sixteenth century, the terminology used by intellectuals in the 
broad sense to refer to the religious field was the same in Chinese and Japanese. The Japa-
nese language, although genealogically unrelated to Chinese, had picked up a great num-
ber of loanwords from Chinese during the first phase of intensive cultural contact since 
around the fifth century of the common era. Almost all lexemes in abstract wordfields 
were of Chinese origin, i.e., written with Chinese characters and pronounced in what 
was an approximation of the Middle Chinese pronounciation. Although the religious 
landscape in Japan was quite different from that of China, this fact had little impact on 
those parts of the lexicon dealing with religious terminology. Accordingly, the dominant 
hypernym embracing religious traditions was jiao (Jap. kyō), literally “teaching.” In most 
cases, both in premodern China and Japan, reference to distinguishable groups worked 
by resorting to jiao, less frequently to dao (Jap. dō, “way”). Both terms are notable for 
including traditions that even broad modern definitions of “religion” would not cover, 
such as philosophical teachings in the case of jiao or martial arts in the case of dao.
Perhaps the best example of the Chinese usage of jiao to label traditions in a way that 
distinguished them while stressing their similarity was the sanjiao paradigm. The three 
traditions of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism, dominant in China for centuries, 
were in the sanjiao discourse regarded as complementary members of the same group 
of entities, namely jiao (perhaps translatable also as “world views”). While this kind of 
argument had a reconciliatory side to it, as a way to reduce the tensions of competition, 
most often the three jiao were presented in a clear hierarchy, with Confucianism residing 
at the top.6 Indeed, the semantic prototype of jiao in China clearly was Confucianism, a 
fact that remains visible well into the nineteenth century.7
Not only the terminology, but even the scheme of the sanjiao was adopted in Japan from 
early on. Around 800, Kūkai (774–835), the figure today identified as the founder of the 
influential Shingon lineage of Buddhism, authored a fictional dialogue between a Con-
fucian, a Buddhist, and a Daoist entitled Sangō shīki (“Tenets of the Three Teachings”). 
Daoism had at this time still some significance as an institutionalized religion in Japan, 
while the worship of indigenous deities (later called Shintō8) apparently played no role 
for Kūkai, who set Buddhism at the apex of the sanjiao. Indeed, different from China, 
the prototype of jiao (Jap. kyō) for most authors of the ancient and medieval period in 
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Confucianism. The inclusion of Daoism and the exclusion of Shintō was to change in 
later times (from about the sixteenth century onwards), after Daoism had lost its role as 
a clearly identifiable tradition of its own in Japan, and Shintō was adopted as the third 
partner next to Confucianism and Buddhism.9
Since about the tenth century, however, combinatory practices, as the dominant Bud-
dhist way to approach kami worship, were more important for the conceptual grasp 
of what later came to be called Shintō. Combinatory practices here refer to the dis-
covery of various correspondences between kami and Buddhist deities, correspondences 
which found expression in institutional and ritual amalgamations and combinations.10 
Throughout the medieval period (roughly between the twelfth and sixteenth centuries), 
Japanese Buddhism11 thus incorporated indigenous deities into its own universe in a 
sometimes highly sophisticated fashion, albeit as subordinate. It has been claimed that, 
conceptually speaking, this combinatory paradigm was a hermeneutic that “den[ied] dif-
ference by translating alternate positions into the ‘true’ language of a particular ideology” 
(i.e., Buddhism).12
Regarding the two alternatives of sanjiao vs. combinatory practices, religious pluralism in 
pre-sixteenth century Japan was either denied in a system of subsumption under existing 
creeds (Jason Josephson speaks of a system of “hierarchical inclusion”13) or muted within 
the framework of different “teachings” under the predominant hypernym of the religious 
field jiao. All of this remained unchanged until the advent of Christianity in the middle 
of the sixteenth century.
1. Buddhist Appropriations of Christianity Around 1600
Just as the first Japanese Buddhists to encounter Christians identified them as adhering 
to some (hitherto unknown) variant of Buddhism, the first Christians to hear about Jap-
anese Buddhism were surprised to find a religion seemingly so very much like their own. 
This impression was fostered in the Japanese missionaries even before they set out for Ja-
pan through their earliest Japanese informant, Anjirō, who came into contact with Jesuit 
missionaries at their base in Malacca. Anjirō reported that the Japanese worshipped only 
		9	 This	triad	was	well	established	until	the	end	of	the	Tokugawa	period	in	the	middle	of	the	nineteenth	century.	
References	to	the	“three	teachings”	in	this	meaning	can	be	found	in	a	number	of	writings	including	Tominaga	
Nakamoto’s	746	tract	discussing	the	respective	worth	of	the	three	teachings	entitled	Okina no fumi (The	Writ-
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one God, a personal God, who had created all things and who rewarded good and pun-
ished evil.14 Francisco de Xavier, the first missionary to Japan, even employed the name 
of the Buddha central to the Shingon sect, Dainichi, as a term for the Christian God 
during his first months of proselytizing.15 The Society’s historian of the missionary activi-
ties in Japan, Luís Fróis (1532–1597) relates that this identification was not regarded as 
absurd by the Japanese Buddhists themselves. Of a meeting between Xavier and priests 
of the Shingon sect in Yamaguchi in 1551, Fróis writes:
When they heard our things, it appeared to the bonzes that the divine attributes were 
very similar to their Dainichi, for which reason they told the Pater [i.e. Xavier] that 
while they may be different in their words, language, and clothing, the content of the law 
professed by the Pater and that of their own were one and the same.16
Although the Jesuit historian George Elison dismisses these early identifications as “un-
avoidable initial misunderstandings”17 and adds that “the points of resemblance [of 
Christianity] with Buddhism were ephemeral and delusory,”18 to mid-sixteenth century 
Japanese, perhaps the natural, if not the only, way to deal with the newly arrived faith 
may have been to comprehend it within the epistemic framework of Buddhism.
At a basic level, this epistemic framework entailed the very language available to Japanese 
for dealing with Christianity, a language that was full of Buddhist terms. This is clearly 
visible in what is likely the earliest reference to the Christian missionaries in a Japanese 
document. In 1551, two years after his arrival in Japan, Xavier received a piece of land 
for building a church by Ōuchi Yoshinaga, a local lord in Western Japan.19 Yoshinaga’s 
letter of authorization read: “In the matter of Daidō Temple in […] Suō Province, the 
[Buddhist] priests who came from the West to Japan with the purpose of letting flourish 
the Law of the Buddha shall be granted their request to build this temple […].”
The reason we know of this document today is because a copy of the original, accompa-
nied by a transcription and a Portuguese translation, was sent to Europe and published 
there in 1570. 20 The 1570 Portuguese rendering of the passage concerning the “priests 
who came from the West” runs “aos padres do Poente que vierão declarar ley de fazer 
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It seems to be a matter of course for the regional lord to refer to the missionaries as 
priests, employing the Japanese term for “Buddhist priest” (sō), and their aim as spread-
ing the “Law of the Buddha” (hō).21 Viewed from historical linguistics, Yoshinaga could 
hardly have expressed himself otherwise indeed at this early stage of the encounter as 
there were no linguistic alternatives available to him. In the past, not all historians have 
shared this view. Catholic historian Hans Haas, writing in the 1900s, suggested that the 
missionaries here might have consciously employed “heathen” vocabulary in order to 
trick their hosts into giving them the property they desired. In his 1954 biography of 
Ōuchi Yoshitaka (Yoshinaga’s father), historian of early modern Japan Fukuo Takeichirō 
has opined that the term “Law of the Buddha” was used because in patents such as the 
one issued here to the Christian missionaries, a fixed set of terms was used. Fukuo adds 
that since the missionaries took care to differentiate themselves from Buddhism wherever 
they could and Yoshinaga had no personal sympathies for Christianity, it is unlikely that 
“Law of the Buddha” was simply employed for referring to Christianity without any 
afterthoughts.22
A “Summary of Errors,” penned by the Japan missionary Baltasar Gago in 1557, explic-
itly explains buppō, the Japanese word for “Law of the Buddha,” by calling it the umbrella 
term for the eight or nine sects of Japanese Buddhism, juxtaposing it to the sects of kami 
(i.e., Shintō) and of yamabushi (i.e., Shugendō, a practice of mountain asceticism draw-
ing on elements from Buddhism and indigenous kami cults).23 That is to say, by 1557 the 
missionaries certainly did not regard themselves as purveyors of buppō.24 Nonetheless, 
this is not to say that, six years earlier, Japanese Buddhists, much less a political ruler, 
might not have done just that.
The French historian of Japanese thought Frédéric Girard has added that another impor-
tant reason Japanese Buddhists conceived of the Christian missionaries as Buddhists was 
that they came from the West, i.e., the direction of India, whence Buddhism had also 
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1.1 “The Christian Law”
Among the known sources that mention Christianity, the earliest ones are not per se 
of Buddhist provenance but are political decrees, such as the one from Yamaguchi just 
referred to. That these were usually authored by Buddhist aides to rulers might go a long 
way toward explaining why Buddhist terminology was dominant in such decrees. The 
earliest decree of nationwide prominence is the 1587 edict for expulsion of the mission-
aries, issued in the name of the national ruler Toyotomi Hideyoshi, but in fact written by 
Yakuin Zensō Toku’un, a former monk of the Tendai school of Buddhism.26 This “Edict 
for the Expulsion of the Padres” reads in part:27
As Japan is the Land of the Gods, diffusion here from the Christian Countries of a devi-
ous law [jahō] is most undesirable. […] It is the judgment that since the Padres by means 
of their clever law [chie no hō] amass parishioners as they please, the unfortunate situa-
tion has resulted that, as mentioned before, the Law of the Buddha [buppō] is violated 
in these Precincts of the Sun.
In contrast to 1551, Christianity here is clearly seen as running counter to buppō, the 
Law of the Buddha. Yet it is still regarded as “a law” (hō), albeit a “devious” and “clever” 
one. The other famous expulsion edict from 1613/14, authored in the name of Tokuga-
wa Ieyasu and penned by the Zen monk Konchi’in Sūden, makes use of the same kind 
of language:
[The missionaries] recklessly desire to spread a devious law [jahō], confound the true sects, 
change the governmental authority of this realm, and make it their own possession. […] 
They look at the example of a criminal, and become excited, blindly running after him. 
They themselves pray to him and offer him sacrifice. This is what they take as their object 
of reverence and salvation in their sect! How is this not a devious law [jahō]? 28
The key term in both texts is jahō, rendered here literally as “devious law.”29 While to 
some degree this becomes a set phrase by the late sixteenth century, used when referring 
to Christianity, other combinations with “law” are also used, as can be seen in the “clever 
law” in 1587. What this means is that either Christianity as a whole or something like 
its contents or substance (i.e. its teaching) was labeled as “law,” also the common term 
for either the Buddhist sects or the Buddhist teaching at a time when there was not yet a 
concept equivalent to what we today call “Buddhism.”30 The usage of “law” as a general 
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term here obviously parallels the late medieval European custom, where “leges” (and also 
“sectae”) was frequently used as plural for religious groups (more so than “religiones”),31 
an impression corroborated by the inclusion of “ley” in the Portuguese rendering of the 
1551 land grant document from Yamaguchi referred to above and in Fróis’s referring to 
both Christianity and Buddhism as “laws” in his description of the meeting mentioned 
above between Francisco Xavier and Buddhist priests in Yamaguchi in 1551.
1.2 “The Christian Sect”
Aside from “law” (hō), The 1613/14 expulsion edict makes use of a further term which 
came into popular use in the subsequent centuries when referring to religions. Where 
the English translation above reads “the true sects” or “their sect” – and where Kiri Para-
more’s translation of the same text in fact reads “true religion” and “their religion” – the 
original employs the term shū. Originally meaning “ancestor,” shū had from the time 
of the introduction of Buddhism into East Asia been used to refer to specific teacher-
disciple lineages and by the sixteenth century been firmly established in Japan as the 
standard term used to refer to distinguishable Buddhists sects or schools (such as Zen or 
Pure Land, etc.).32 Like “law,” this “sect” is apparently easily transferred to Christianity, 
as the wording of the 1613/14 edict shows: Christianity may not have been a true sect, 
but it certainly is a sect. As the first instance of the term here suggests (“confound the 
true sects”), it might actually have meant something more akin to “religious truth,” but 
in fact shū was used rather exclusively, at least in the following two centuries, for the 
institutional dimension of religion, i.e., religious group or sect or denomination (a close 
equivalent is the German “Konfession”).
In another early instance of ascription, historian Ikuo Higashibaba relates that the mis-
sionaries were referred to as “people from Tenjiku,” i.e., literally from “India.” The India 
called Tenjiku in Japanese around 1600, however, was largely a mythical place that no 
Japanese had set foot upon for generations; used to designate an unknown country far 
away, tenjiku had a function similar to “India” in early modern Europe.33 Higashibaba 
explains this ascription by arguing that the Japanese “could only make sense of them as 
men from the most remote land possible.”34 What is more important for our context, 
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referred to as the “Indian sect.”35 While Higashibaba fails to give a reference, one can 
indeed find the combination tenjiku-shū in a letter from c. 1578. In this letter from a 
concerned vassal of a domain neighboring the territory of the Ōtomo family, who had 
converted to Christianity, the vassals of the Ōtomo are warned that the disturbances in 
their domain are the result of the fact that “old and young, men and women, have all 
become adherents of the Indian sect.”36 Emphasizing the foreignness of Christianity in 
this way certainly was a means of delegitimizing it. Hence, the letter clearly indicates a 
context hostile to Christians, but the recognition as a “sect” is never questioned. 
1.3 Other Terms (Teaching, Way)
In contrast to “law” and “sect,” the term “teaching” (Jap. kyō or Chin. jiao), which had 
up to the sixteenth century been the predominant umbrella term, after 1600 was increas-
ingly used for the substance of a teaching or its contents. This is strikingly obvious in the 
following quote from the 1605 Myōtei mondō, a fictional dialogue between Christians 
and Buddhists written by a Christian convert, and indeed the first native tract of sub-
stantial length on Christianity that we still know of today:37
To enter the road to assistance [of salvation], in Christian teaching [kyō] you take what 
is called baptism. If you take just this sacrament, follow the ten commandments of this 
religion [shū], and respect and revere God, then you can relax and be sure of an afterlife 
in Heaven.38
“Teaching,” “way,” and to a lesser degree a few other terms continued to be employed as 
umbrella terms up until the nineteenth century. Yet in many texts, a differentiation such 
as the one just shown between a religion’s institutional aspect and its substance or essence 
was reflected in the linguistic distinction between “sect” (and sometimes “law”) on the 
one side and terms such as “teaching” on the other.
After this brief exposition of the lexical basics, I will now turn my attention to how use 
of the concepts mentioned above developed against the background of a new religious 
policy beginning with the seventeenth century.
2. Grasping Christianity in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Japan
The texts thus far referred to really do not tell us much about how Christianity was per-
ceived, especially not about how it was grasped by Buddhists, but suggest the contexts in 
	 I.	Higashibaba,	Christianity	(as	in	note	4),	p.	44.
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which Christianity was referred to in Japanese around 1600. Buddhist examples proper 
are only extant from a very late stage, namely the middle of the seventeenth century, 
which means several decades after the proscription of Christianity and contemporary to 
the last excecutions of large groups of Christians. At this time, a whole genre of vulgar 
anti-Christian literature appeared with little interest in precise descriptions of its object 
of scorn;39 roughly at the same time, however, the first examples of more scholarly at-
tempts at refutation also made their appearance. Two early treatments of this sort will be 
introduced briefly in the following; they are illuminating for their use of terminology as 
it had become established 100 years after the first introduction of Christianity into the 
country. Even more so, they are influenced by the religious policy that was introduced at 
the time they were written.
2.1 Religious Policies of the Early Tokugawa Period
Two policies affecting religious groups taken by the early Tokugawa polity established by 
Tokugawa Ieyasu in 1603 were to have a tremendous impact on the semantic range used 
to refer to “religion(s).” Even before assuming nationwide power, Ieyasu as a regional 
leader in 1597 addressed a decree to “the Pure Land Sect [shū] in the Kantō [provinces],” 
a step unusual at the time for not being directed at an individual temple but instead at 
a sect as a whole. While this decree still retained a regional limitation, from 1615 on-
wards, after the Tokugawa had consolidated their new central authority over all of Japan, 
they passed a number of laws and regulations directed at whole sects. While individual 
temples could still be targets of such legislation, four of the six major denominations 
were covered by such laws between 1612 and 1656, until a law for “temples of all sects” 
was finally promulgated in 1665.40
This was part of an effort by the shogunate to formalize allegiances between temples, 
which had previously been rather informal. A sect was now recognized through its head 
temple, and each minor temple in the country had to affiliate with one of these head 
temples, thus clearly becoming a member of one specific sect. “This was to provide, for 
the first time, […] a legal framework for religious institutions which resulted in uni-
fied sects that transcended regional and lineage boundaries to encompass the whole of 
Japan.”41
Next to this new structure, known as the “system of roots and branches” (honmatsu 
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Christianity but made use of, and by doing so formed, Buddhist institutions as well. 
The controls of religious affiliation enforced since the second half of the seventeenth 
century were actually a set of two complementary measures: the forced registration of all 
households with a Buddhist temple, and a religious census, requiring all households to 
periodically certify their affiliation with a Buddhist temple.
While the Japanese population certainly had many contacts to religion in the two hun-
dred years this system was in force, it was through this certification system that they were 
most frequently confronted with an abstract religious terminology set down in writing. 
It was here that the term “sect” (shū or shūmon) became firmly established as the central 
umbrella term encompassing both the “legitimate” Buddhist schools and the “devious” 
Christian “sect.” In the annual census, known at the time as “the investigation into sec-
tarian affiliation” (shūmon aratame), household heads were assigned the name of one 
“sect” each, while for each census unit, e.g. each village, there followed a declaration that 
none of the persons investigated adhered to “the devious sect,” i.e., Christianity.43
Due to the strong influence of this political practice on linguistic practices, “law,” when 
applied to Christianity, soon came to lose its organizational associations, which became 
almost wholly absorbed by “sect.” Thus, by the first half of the eighteenth century, a 
certificate of sectarian affiliation could end in the phrase: “The afore-mentioned is not 
[member] of the sect of the devious Christian law,”44 in which one must interpret the 
“law,” if one wants to make sense of the duplication of terms, as referring to the doctrinal 
dimension.
2.2 Anti-Christian Writings
The introduction of anti-Christian policies was accompanied by anti-Christian propa-
ganda, both the vulgar and the more sophisticated variety.45 The two most interesting 
and most clearly Buddhist early writings will be dealt with in the following, again focus-
ing on language use. Both authors treated here were also politically active in the suppres-
sion of Christianity.
Suzuki Shōsan
Suzuki Shōsan (1579–1655) was a warrior who fought on the victorious side of the 
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came a Buddhist monk of the Sōtō Zen persuasion. In 1642 he followed a call for help by 
his brother, the feudal lord assigned by the shogunate to the Amakusa Islands in south-
ern Japan. The Amakusa Islands had been one of the centers of Christian conversion in 
Japan towards the end of the sixteenth century; indeed, the collegio the Jesuits had set 
up in 1580 moved to the Amakusa Islands in 1591 where it remained until Christianity 
was forbidden in this feudal domain after 1600. A large part of the population, however, 
remained Christians for a long period afterwards, and the Rebellion of Shimabara and 
Amakusa of 1637/1638, the last major threat to the shogunate for over 200 years, was 
identified by the shogunate with Christianity.47 After this rebellion was forcefully sup-
pressed, the local authorities and the shogunate were intent on taking anti-Christian 
action.48 This partly explains why Suzuki Shōsan was called here in 1642, where his task 
was to lead the populace from their heretical convictions into the fold of Buddhism. In 
his three years on the islands, Shōsan founded no less than 17 Buddhist temples and 
brought with him special funds from the shogunate for the maintenance of these temples 
and the two Shintō shrines already in existence.49
It was in this context that Shōsan wrote his tract “Countering Christianity” (Ha kirishi-
tan), which was first published posthumously in 1662. The short text, which names basic 
Christian tenets in order to show their absurdity, was thus probably written for a wider 
audience.50 Shōsan’s technique is to compare Christian items of belief with principles of 
Buddhism and Confucianism, often of an ethical character, or by appeal to a supposed 
common sense. His main line of argument is to draw a clear contrast between Buddhist 
universality and Christian dualism (with only one divine entity).51
Rhetorically, Shōsan’s tract is remarkable for its use of Buddhist language to describe 
Christianity, even identifying the Christian God as a buddha: “According to the Chris-
tian teachings, the Great Buddha named Deus is the Lord of Heaven and Earth and is 
the One Buddha.”52 Partially, this is a subversive rhetoric strategy because in his further 
argument, Shōsan then claims that the Christian God is not really a buddha: “In truth, 
this Deus is a foolscap Buddha!”53 And in the end, Shōsan makes clear that the Chris-
tians really do not know anything about the true Buddha: “This Christian sect will not 
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There is thus to some extent a conscious strategy in first calling the Christian God a bud-
dha but then denying that he really is one. On the other hand, even when denouncing 
the Christian God as a fool, there was really no other way to do this in Shōsan’s time than 
within the category of “a Buddha.” Furthermore, as in Myōtei Mondō, quoted above in 
1.3, Shōsan differentiates between “Christian teachings” and “Christian sect,” employing 
shū when referring to the overall entity, not just its doctrines.
Sessō Sōsai
While Christianity remained a peripheral and superficially treated subject for Suzuki 
Shōsan (who left behind a great number of writings), it was much more central to a 
contemporary of his, Sessō Sōsai (1573–1649), also a Zen monk, albeit of the Rinzai 
Zen persuasion. Sōsai was a resident priest of a Kyūshū temple, who apparently spent 
some time with Shōsan while the latter was in southern Japan. He is also known to have 
preached in Nagasaki, i.e., a former Christian stronghold, in 1647, which may explain 
his interest in the refutation of the Christian teachings.55 In 1648, Sōsai penned the 
best-informed work on Christianity of the period after the wholesale eradication of the 
creed,56 the Taiji jashūron (“Refuting the Teachings of the Evil Sect”), first published in 
1668.
The work was probably intended for the use of the Buddhist clergy, “who were then 
made official instruments to repudiate Kirishitan propaganda.”57 In it, Sōsai takes up 
Christian arguments against Buddhism in some depth and tries to counter them. Re-
markably, Sōsai follows the idea, more typical of earlier forms of religious contact,58 that 
Christianity is genealogically linked to Buddhism:
Although he professed his adherence to Śākyamuni, Jesus merely learned the name and 
form of things and did not arrive at their deeper and hidden meaning. By deception, he 
stole Śākyamuni’s [principle of the] characteristics of things [i.e. all things are of monad 
nature but differ in form] and created a heterodox way and a deviant view: Either he 
grasped the reality [of things] after changing their names or he differed in their substance 
although the things are identical.59
In this way, Sōsai argued that many aspects of Christianity were not necessarily wrong 
but were rather evil because they were illicitly stolen from Buddhism and renamed or 
misunderstood. Of this, he gives many examples, including angels, paradise, purgatory, 
hell, baptism, confession, the Ten Commandments, or excommunication.60 Sōsai claims 
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[the Christians] expound the laws of the name and form of things of Buddhism, of the 
first learning of Confucianism, and of the rites of Shintō.”61
The general Christian strategy towards those interested in the faith and towards fresh 
converts is described by Sōsai as follows: “At first, they do not expose their own law and 
do not slander the teachings of other sects.”62 Rather, they engaged in charitable works. 
Only after some time, argued Sōsai, did they turn to open attempts at conversion by 
claiming the superiority and source of their teaching:
Yet afterwards, Xavier strove to make the ruler convert to his denomination, build tem-
ples, and publicly speak on his devious law. […] If our law does not suit your heart, you 
should stand by the purport of your original sect; if, however, you fully grasp the source of 
our sect, you should convert to our denomination.63
Sōsai’s wording makes it rather difficult to differentiate between “law” and “sect” pre-
cisely. Perhaps “law” is thought by him as identical to “source of our sect.” Either way, the 
terminology generalizing the entity Christianity and its teachings throughout the text is 
identical to that used for Buddhism, including the standard terms for “sect” discussed 
above.
Tominaga Nakamoto and Arai Hakuseki
It is important to note that the establishment of the new umbrella terms “law” and “sect” 
did not mean that the old terms, above all, “teaching,” were immediately replaced or 
relegated to new and more narrow meanings. More than anything else, the choice of vo-
cabulary was a question of the persuasion of the writer. Among the non-Buddhists it was 
especially Confucians who came to dominate Tokugawa-period theorizing on religious 
and non-religious teachings.64 While they sometimes did make use of the vocabulary of 
“sect” and “law,” more often than not they would resort to the more traditional categories 
of “teaching,” “way,” etc.
This was also the case where teachings are explicitly compared, as in the following two 
prominent examples. Tominaga Nakamoto (1715–1746), “a Tokugawa iconoclast,”65 
authored what was perhaps the most provocative essay on comparative teachings during 
the Tokugawa Period, effectively arguing that none of the three traditional teachings 
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Nakamoto throughout uses “teaching” to refer to the hypernym of Confucianism, Bud-
dhism, and Shintō. The alternative traditional category of “way” is employed by him 
for a higher level of truth that he considers to be the alternative to the three teachings. 
Accordingly, Tominaga starts his essay, fictitiously attributed to an anonymous old man, 
as follows: “These writings, said to be the work of a certain Old Man, have been made 
available to me by a friend. […] He emphatically expounds the theory that there is the 
Way of Truth besides the Ways of the Three Teachings.”66 Tominaga never uses “sect,” 
and wherever he uses “law,” he is referring to Buddhism exclusively, such as when he 
states that those who compiled a certain sutra “claimed that it represented Buddha’s 
teachings during twenty-seven days after his enlightenment, illuminating the world as 
the sun over the mountains, and thus excelled all other laws.”67 The single exception is 
at a point where Tominaga criticizes the unconditional reliance of those expounding a 
certain teaching on earlier authorities of their respective tradition: “But here is the argu-
ment of the Old Man: it is a general rule that, from ancient times, those who preached 
the Way and established the law had always their ancestors to whom they attributed 
the authenticity of their Way and law.”68 Although it is not entirely clear what law does 
denote here, it certainly does not refer only to Buddhism, nor does it mean law in the 
sense of legal stipulation. Katō, who translates “doctrines” here, appears to be close to 
what Tominaga is driving at, although his wording seems to imply that “way” and “law” 
are regarded to be on the same level, i.e., “law” is not something subordinate to “way” (as 
“doctrines” would imply), but rather an alternative categorical term for the same thing 
that Tominaga expresses with “way.”
The second insightful text is from the only Japanese intellectual who had an encounter 
with an actual Christian during the eighteenth century. The eminent Confucian thinker 
and statesman Arai Hakuseki (1657–1725) had the unique opportunity in 1709 to in-
terrogate the Italian priest Giovanni Battista Sidotti, who was captured in Nagasaki the 
year before when attempting to enter the country in disguise. In 1715, Hakuseki penned 
his “Record of Things Heard from the West” (Seiyō kibun), which remained unpublished 
for over 150 years, but circulated widely in intellectual circles in Japan even in the eigh-
teenth century.
Hakuseki’s impression of what he learned from Sidotti and from his study of older Japa-
nese and Chinese books on Christianity resembles that of Sessō Sōsai: “From the expla-
nation of the beginning of the world and mankind to that of paradise and hell, they all 
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ties were no coincidence: From what he could tell from a Dutch world map, Judaea, the 
birthland of the founder of Christianity, was not very far from Western India, so that it 
seemed plausible for him to assume that Buddhism had earlier penetrated Judaea and 
that Christianity was but a degenerated form of Buddhism.70
This conclusion is preceded by Hakuseki’s paraphrase of Sidotti’s explanations of Chris-
tianity and of his motives for coming to Japan. Although Sidotti had learned some Japa-
nese in the Japanese colony in Manila before setting out for Japan, the interrogation was 
conducted with the help of official Dutch translators,71 and the resulting paraphrase in 
Seiyō kibun almost certainly reflects Hakuseki’s own language and choice of words. On 
his appraisal of the situation of Christianity in Japan, Hakuseki quotes Sidotti as having 
said:
As concerns the fact that our law is not practiced in these environs, there is no need to 
speak at length about times long past. […] That our law is presently prohibited is because 
the Dutch spread the following information about our teaching: “It confuses the world 
and plunders countries.”72 
Hakuseki’s usage of both “law” and “teaching” here seems to reflect less a deliberate 
distinction between the two terms but rather the tacit assumption of their rough equiva-
lence. “Law” is clearly used where one would today expect “religion,” while “teaching” 
might refer to the doctrine of this religion, although it seems more plausible to see in it 
just another synonym for religion. Yet when Sidotti explains to Hakuseki that there are 
three world religions (namely Christianity, heathendom, and Islam), Hakuseki’s para-
phrase of Sidotti’s explanation of heathendom or paganism suggests that while “law” and 
“sect” are treated almost synonymously, “teaching” is relatively clearly reserved for doc-
trine: “When I asked him about this law, he said that in this sect they erect many Bud-
dhas and serve them, but when it came to its teaching, [his answer] was not clear.”73
3. Comparison to China
The Japanese language used (and still uses) the same writing system for complex and 
abstract lexemes as Chinese; in fact, up to the nineteenth century, a large part of that 
vocabulary was adopted from Chinese or rather shared across an East Asian koinē of in-
tellectual production, which also included Korea. Looking at China and Chinese is thus 
in principle a valid point of comparison, especially as both China and Japan (as well as 
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in each country) to render the modern term “religion” by the end of the nineteenth 
century.
In China, as stated above, the conceptual pull of “teaching” (pronounced as jiao in mod-
ern Chinese) was predominant until the nineteenth century. Groups regarded as hetero-
dox by the state were thus almost always labeled “deviant teachings” (xiejiao) or, taking 
the proper name of a fourteenth-century precedent that came to be seen as the heterodox 
group par excellence, as “White Lotus Teaching” (bailianjiao).74 It was this “White Lotus 
Teaching” that Christianity was likened to by Yuan Guangxin in his classic collection of 
anti-Christian texts published in 1665 under the title Budeyi (I Cannot Do Otherwise). 
In this work, the standard way of referring to Christianity is either by “Teaching of the 
Lord of Heaven” (tianzhu jiao) or “deviant teaching.” The Chinese equivalent to “sect” 
(zong) does not appear even once; “law,” however, is used a few times to refer to Christi-
anity (such as in “the new law from the West” or “the upright law of Jesus”).75
There was a precedent in labeling a non-Buddhist entity as “law” or “dharma,” and that 
was medieval Daoism.76 The French sinologist Michel Strickmann has even argued that 
“law” was the closest equivalent to “religion” in late ancient and early medieval China:
Taoism offered a hierarchy of carefully trained, literate priests, the Tao’s own representa-
tives on earth. […] Taoists worked through meditations: a strictly prescribed and modu-
lated system of communication with the invisible world, framed by established ritual pro-
cedures. All this is comprised within the Taoists’ term for their religion and its rituals – fa, 
or ‘the Law.’ Fa is also used by Chinese Buddhists to render the Sanskrit word dharma. It 
is perhaps the Chinese word most closely approximating our own term ‘religion’ […] Fa, 
then, suggests exemplary behavior or a ritual model.77
It seems, however, that, as Strickmann himself mentions, it was rather the ritual practice 
than the entity which was referred to by that term. Equally, considering that “law” was 
rarely employed by Chinese Buddhists in referring to Daoism and that it was rarely ap-
plied to other teachings, especially Christianity, in the subsequent course of history, it 
would seem to be a weak candidate for an umbrella term. This is probably because the 
jiao paradigm was too dominant (which included, to repeat, decidedly non-religious 
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The role of the term “sect” (Chin. zong or zongmen) was equally limited. In Buddhist 
parlance, it seems to have remained restricted to Buddhist lineages, just as in pre-six-
teenth century Japanese Buddhism. In Daoism, the term zongmen “refers to the series of 
spiritual or historical ancestors as well as differences in substance […] Teaching [jiao], in 
contrast, is the connecting fundament” for the differing lineages.78
In contrast to Japan, where Buddhism was a powerful force both as a popular religious 
faith and politically (in terms of its integration with the imperial court and from the 
medieval period onward as an important counterweight against the military class), in 
China Confucianism was dominant and Buddhism (and Daoism) were relatively weak 
in the last centuries before the onset of modernity. Their respective roles in the field of 
intellectual text production (that is, in their influence on linguistic change), which were a 
reflection of Confucianism’s strength and Buddhism’s weakness, help explain why simply 
retaining the old umbrella term “teaching” seemed sufficient to most Chinese intellectu-
als in the contact with the West up to 1900. 
The tenacity of the paradigm “teaching,” which encompassed both religious and philo-
sophical teachings and worldviews, was much less pronounced in Japan, where semantic 
changes in the words “law” and “sect,” occurring after the first encounter with Christian-
ity in the sixteenth century, had undermined the epistemological unity of “teachings” 
and introduced new distinctions as early as the seventeenth century. Moreover, the his-
torical record indicates that the contemporaneity with Japan’s Christian experience was 
no coincidence. Although the budding central state had started adopting religious poli-
cies in the second half of the sixteenth century independent of Christianity’s advent – be-
tween 1570 and 1580, Oda Nobunaga, the first of three unifiers of the realm, crushed 
several politically powerful Buddhist groups and established offices to regulate religious 
groups – this had little effect on discursive practices. Rather, new linguistic practices were 
stimulated by intellectual debates comparing the merits of different “religions,” as well as 
by religious policies of the Tokugawa Shogunate.
4. Some Distinctions and an Outlook
What do the semantic innovations triggered by the encounter with Christianity tell us 
about changes in general attitudes towards the religious field? It is important to remem-
ber that the usage of “law” and “sect” for non-Buddhist groups was novel in the sixteenth 
century, and it was also by and large unique in East Asia. In terms of sheer quantity, 
“sect” as new umbrella term turned out to be even more important than “law,” as it came 
to be employed in official documents at all levels down to villages and town districts, 
where, as an anti-Christian measure, from the second half of the sixteenth century on-
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Drawing on the distinction between “religion” in the generic meaning (usable as a plural 
term) and as a borderline concept (for a societal subsystem) outlined in the introduction 
to this volume, “sect” (and, to a lesser degree, “law”) clearly demarcated religions in the 
first of these two senses. A possible counterargument against this view is that rather than 
forming a new generic term, “sect” and “law” simply continued to be used as purely 
Buddhist terms and that Christianity was thus subsumed within the framework of Bud-
dhism, a framework which did not change of itself. As anthropologist Gerd Baumann 
has shown in his analysis of “Grammars of Identity / Alterity,” however, such an act of 
hierarchical subsumption (which he calls “encompassment”) necessarily entails a “higher 
level [which] subsumes that which is different under that which is universal.”79 Subor-
dinating the “Christian sect” under the Buddhist sects seems to at least imply the exis-
tence of something universal at a higher level, namely a category of “the religious.” That 
“sect” and “law” were no longer merely Buddhist technical terms by the end of the early 
modern period is also attested to by the fact that they were not exclusively employed by 
Buddhists alone, but to some degree were diffused in the general language (of the elites 
at least).
Also, while there were other terms which functioned as umbrella terms, “sect” and “law” 
did so more sharply, i.e., with a more narrow range of entities. Thus, while a concept 
like “teaching” encompassed Buddhism, Shintō, Christianity, Confucianism,80 or even 
education in general,81 “sect” was applied exclusively to Buddhism and Christianity and 
almost never to Confucianism and Shintō. In fact, those cases in which people spoke 
of “the Shintō sect” (shintō shū or shintō shūmon) are revealing in themselves: A small 
number of Shintō priests employed this terminology in their lobbying efforts to allow 
exceptions from the mandatory registration at Buddhist temples and from non-Buddhist 
funerals. We find the term “sect” applied to Shintō in such contexts for the first time in 
the second half of the eighteenth century, and we find it particularly within priest fami-
lies who had close connections to the nativist school of “national learning” (kokugaku), 
whose thought was fueled by a rabid hatred of all things Chinese.82 This means that 
79	 G.	Baumann,	Grammars	of	Identity	/	Alterity:	A	Structural	Approach,	in:	G.	Baumann	/	A.	Gingrich	(eds),	Grammars	
of	Identity	/	Alterity:	A	Structural	Approach,	Oxford	2004,	pp.	8–0,	here:	p.	2.
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“Shintō sect” was used precisely by radical anti-Buddhist Shintoists who were keen on 
establishing Shintō as an independent religion of equal standing to Buddhism. In other 
words, by resorting to “sect,” they stressed something that was usually regarded as lack-
ing in Shintō but present in Buddhism and Christianity. I want to draw attention to two 
further distinctions before briefly seeking out the continuities between early modern and 
modern conceptual conventions. 
4.1 Heterodoxy vs. Heresy
What does it mean that Christianity is routinely referred to as “the devious law”? It is 
perhaps helpful here to make a distinction not generally considered in the study of Euro-
pean historical material, i.e., that between heterodoxy and heresy. Here, I am following 
the suggestion made recently by buddhologist John LoBreglio who has attempted to 
“draw a distinction between ‘heterodoxy’ as something merely judged to be an ‘other’ 
(heteros) ‘opinion’ (doxa), the abandoning of which is possible through dialogue and 
persuasion, and ‘heresy’ as something that is actively excluded as being ‘beyond the pale’ 
when dialogue has broken down.”83
In the East Asian case, the common terms for “heresy,” i.e., the entirely incommensu-
rable, included “licentious worship” (Chin. yinci or yinsi, Jap. inshi, used, e.g., by anti-
Buddhist Confucianists in medieval China) or “slanted” (Chin. yiduan, Jap. itan, used 
by Chinese Catholics in the early seventeenth century when speaking about Buddhism 
or Daoism).84 In contrast, the terms “devious law” (jahō), “devious sect” (jashū), or “aber-
ring way” (gedō), used for Christianity in early modern Japan, all imply aberration, but 
within a framework of commensurability: it is certainly the wrong sect, law, or way, but 
it is nevertheless a sect, law, or way, while the terms for incommensurable practices or 
entities were usually reserved for magical rituals and so on outside of established religious 
traditions.85
To be sure, the borders between the two ascriptive sets of heterodoxy and heresy were 
not clear-cut, yet overall, and irrespective of author, it was rather the milder label of 
heterodoxy that was applied to Christianity in sixteenth- through nineteenth-century Ja-
pan. Also, while Jason Josephson has pointed out that “Tokugawa intellectuals […] used 
terms such as inshi, jakyō, or jasetsu to describe not only Christianity but a wide range of 
cause	of	Shintō	as	a	“sect”	in	the	sense	described	above.	This	would	allow	us	to	date	the	movement	for	a	“Shintō	
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popular practices from local mediums to Buddhism as a whole,”86 the term jashū, again, 
was significantly only applied to Christianity and not to such popular practices as those 
referred to by Josephson.
4.2 Extension vs. Intension
To determine whether the meaning of a certain word has changed, we first have to clarify 
what we mean by meaning. A basic distinction in philosophical logic distinguishes be-
tween the “extensional” (discrete things that a term can be applied to) and the “inten-
sional” (sic!) (properties or qualities connoted by a word). I have so far spoken almost 
exclusively of the extensions of the terms discussed above, i.e., the question which enti-
ties are encompassed by a certain term. All the concepts referred to, however, have rather 
clear intensions. Both “teaching” and “law,” e.g., have at the core of their meaning the 
contents of a teaching, yet they differ in that ethics are much more important for “teach-
ing,” while religious truth is much more important for “law.”87
What, however, do we gain by distinguishing between the extensional and intensional 
dimensions of meaning? The answer is that it helps us better approach our central ques-
tion: how does religious contact change the language used to speak of the religious? 
The fundamental change introduced when Christianity entered Japan in the sixteenth 
century is that Christianity was added to the extension of a number of existing terms. 
Does this change, however, affect the intension of these terms in any way? While this 
is difficult to judge without a very detailed analysis of a great number of texts, it seems 
that concerning “teaching,” “way,” or “law,” change in intensional meaning was rather 
limited. In the case of “sect,” in contrast, the term seems to have shifted its intension 
from “a set of beliefs, practices following the precedent set through a lineage” towards 
“the organization of religious people recognizable as clear unit.” Religious studies scholar 
Isomae Jun’ichi defines the extension of “sect” in the early modern period even more 
sharply. He claims that 
Shūshi and shūmon, which correspond to [the dimension of ] practice, are basically 
words expressing the relationship of belonging to a specific Buddhist sect such as the Sōtō 
Zen Sect or the Pure Land Sect. This was closely connected to the early modern system of 
control of individuals by the shogunate through the temples known as the temple regis-
tration system, and, before the background of a system of community-level organization 
of religious groups, the term ‘sect’ was recognized as applying only to the Buddhist sects, 
which had been permitted to perform funerary rites. For this reason, Shintō and Confu-
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category, and only Christianity, which was then a forbidden religion, was, as an aberrant 
form of ‘sect,’ seen as ‘the devious sect’ that rejected Buddhist style funerals.88
It is true that the immediate aim of those Shintō priests mentioned above who wanted 
to have Shintō recognized as a “sect” was to obtain exemptions from having to partake in 
Buddhist funerary rites. Yet the ideological context of these efforts shows that this recog-
nition entailed much more, namely a sense of equality with Buddhism. Also, the issue of 
funerary rites was never even mentioned in discussions of “the Christian sect.” Instead, 
as we have seen above, the similarities to Buddhism that were pointed out rather stressed 
issues of doctrine or belief. Another indication that “sect” in the early modern mind was 
about much more than funerary rites can be seen in the transition to the modern period, 
to which I will now turn my attention.
4.3 Towards a General Concept of Religion in Japan
When Japanese were first confronted with the modern term “religion” by speakers of 
European languages in the mid-nineteenth century, there was no self-evident way to 
translate this new concept. A number of neologisms were quickly coined (or rarely used 
existing words resorted to) throughout the 1850s and 1860s.89 In the dozen or so candi-
dates for translation bandied about before a term was finally fixed in the late 1870s, all 
of them compound words consisting of two Chinese characters, it is conspicuous that 
those most frequently used contain either “sect” or “law,” in particular in combination 
with “teaching.” Thus, we find hōkyō (“teaching of the law”), kyōhō (“teaching and law”), 
shūhō (“sectarian law”), shūshi (“gist of a sect”), shūmon (“lineage of a sect”), and finally 
shūkyō (“sectarian teaching”), the term that was to remain the standard translation for 
“religion” until today.
The background for the choice of a compound character including “sect” is that the new 
translation for “religion” was coined in the legal context; the necessity to translate religion 
first arose in the context of international treaties in the 1850s, and the necessity to hone 
the understanding of this new concept became evident in the course of the discussions 
about how to deal with the problem of religions in the context of the new constitution in 
the 1880s. This might explain why “sect,” the term the extension of which most closely 
focused on the organizational dimension, might have been the best fit among the many 
options that were tentatively tried out in the 1860s and 1870s.90 At the same time, “sect” 
was used within the new word for religion to signify the religious essence, so that shūkyō 
refers to those kinds of teachings with a “sectarian” (i.e., religious) character.
This latter nuance is visible in the way Japanese Buddhist writers who were engaged in 
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“sectarian teaching” in the early 1870s.91 In fact, we might find an indication in these 
writings, in which “sect” shifted its primary intensional meaning from “institution” or 
“organization” toward a more emphatically “religious” or “transcendent” character, of the 
importance of the encounter with Christianity in the sixteenth century, and of its long-
term effect on historical semantics. The answer partly seems to depend on whether we 
want to accept a relationship between the two meanings of religion sketched above: Is 
the grasping of different entities as similar, i.e., as “religions,” a step towards recognizing 
an abstract entity of social and cultural life we call “religion”? It is precisely the transition 
period of the mid-nineteenth century which one would have to subject to a detailed 
analysis that might potentially offer an answer to this fundamental methodological prob-
lem, an analysis, however, that transcends the scope of the present paper.
9	 Secondary	scholarship	has	not	yet	addressed	this	issue.	Examples	of	Buddhists	making	use	of	“sect”	in	this	way	
around	870	are	the	True	Pure	Land	priests	Shimaji	Mokurai,	Higuchi	Ryōon,	and	Sada	Kaiseki.
